BEIRUT � I do not spend much time mingling with officers in the United States armed forces, but when I do, usually at a conference or international gathering, or reading texts on the web, I always come away from the experience more heartened than threatened. Presumably, so does President George W. Bush, who spends much of his time deploying or threatening to use the U.S. military against terrorists around the world, or against Iran � or demonizing mainstream Islamists movements that defy the United States. He and others in Washington would profit from reading a sensible and timely short paper by Colonel Laurence Andrew Dobrot, Deputy Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s Airborne Laser Program. Just published, in November 2007, by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, it is entitled “The Global War on Terrorism: A Religious War?” It makes a cogent case for a change in strategy in the American-led global war on terror. It sees the existing strategy as having limited impact, and even that, “The nation’s current policies and actions may, in fact, be creating more, not fewer, terrorists.” Those in the United States who are fed up with hearing people around the world point out the flaws in American foreign policy may be more inclined to listen to an American soldier who speaks from experience in the global war on terror � he served in Afghanistan � and understands the strengths and limits of military power. After five years of driving the global war on terrorism (GWOT), including the loss of over 3,000 Americans, Dobrot writes, “many people question whether the U.S. strategy is working, and whether the United States understands how to combat an enemy motivated by a radical revolutionary religious ideology.” He suggests three root causes of the terror problem as manifested by Al-Qaeda and other such groups: the lack of wealth-sharing in Muslim countries, resentment of Western exploitation of Muslim countries, and a U.S. credibility gap within the Muslim community. Comparing the ends, ways and means of Washington’s war on terror with those of Al-Qaeda and other such groups, he concludes that the United States is not achieving its long-term strategic objectives in the war on terror, and recommends that “U.S. strategy focus on the root causes of Islamic (sic) hostility.” He suggests that the United States combat radical Islam from within the Muslim community by consistently supporting the efforts of moderate Muslim nations to build democratic institutions that are acceptable in Islamic terms. Part of his recommendations is worth quoting at length: “The GWOT is an ideological battle. Our enemy is a group of violent religious extremists who are trying to unify Islam under their banner. The nature and circumstances of this war make it one that the United States cannot win militarily. Two objectives are identified in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: defeat violent extremism and create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists. These are the correct ends. However, the United States may be failing to apply appropriate ways and means to achieve these goals. It has clearly demonstrated the capability to find and eliminate the most violent of terrorists, but does it have the capability to create a future global environment that will be inhospitable to violent extremism? The nation’s current policies and actions may, in fact, be creating more, not fewer extremists(�.)” A principal focus of this strategy must be to establish among the umma [the Muslim community] the credibility of the United States and its policy. Two recommendations are proposed to help shape that future: First, the United States must be seen as “just” to reestablish its credibility and legitimacy in the Muslim world. Second, the United States must communicate and promote democracy in terms that the Muslim world understands and respects. To achieve its long-term objective of creating an inhospitable environment for violent extremists through the creation of democratic institutions in nation-states, the United States must consistently focus its reform efforts on those predominately Muslim nations with which it already has relationships�To repair its credibility, the United States must focus on applying just practices. The United States must hold the Israelis, the Saudis, the Egyptians, and itself accountable to standards and policies perceived among mainstream Muslims as being consistent. Specifically, the United States must recognize democratically-elected governments such as Hamas and actively engage them in public diplomacy, even if it disagrees with them. Col. Dobrot also mentions Iran, and the Arab-Israeli conflict as arenas where the United States can and must re-establish its credibility with Muslim populations and societies. I don’t know how well Col. Dobrot is doing in protecting the United States with his Airborne Laser Program, but his assessment of how to fight terrorism seems to me an intellectual and analytical “direct hit” that deserves wide consideration.

Editor’s note: The article referenced is available at //www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB822.pdf)

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the 2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award. �2008 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global