Reckless hawks in Israel and the United States continue to talk up the possibility — even the unavoidability — of a strike against Iran to destroy its nuclear facilities.

Moreover, according to Seymour M. Hersh in the July 7 issue of The New Yorker, U. S. Special Forces are already engaged in extensive clandestine operations inside Iran using ethnic minorities and dissident groups in a bid not just to undermine Iran’s nuclear ambitions but also to destabilize and overthrow President Ahmadinejad’s regime.

So far, these crude threats and covert actions, as well as the fitful diplomacy of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, have had no perceptible impact on Iran’s ongoing uranium enrichment programm.

Indeed, the indications are that Iran will reject the package of economic and other incentives which America, Britain, France, Russia and China, plus Germany, have offered it in exchange for a full suspension of its enrichment activities. The trouble is that these incentives do not address Iran’s real needs.

Tehran may, however, agree to a temporary freeze-for-freeze deal as proposed by Javier Solana, the European Union foreign policy chief. That is to say, it might agree to a six-weeks’ freeze in enhancing its uranium enrichment in exchange for an equally brief sanctions freeze. The idea would be to allow “talks about talks” to take place. But any such pause is evidently a million miles away from full suspension.

It must also be said that, in spite of their repeated threats, it is highly unlikely that Israel and/or the United States will attack Iran. The consequences of such an attack — on oil supplies and oil prices, on the economies of the Arab Gulf states, on the security of U.S. troops and bases in the area, on the creation of terrorists, and on Israel’s own ultimate survival — are simply too daunting to contemplate.

In a word, although we are witnessing much war-mongering, it is widely recognized that war against Iran would be sheer madness.

Is there an alternative strategy for resolving the Iran crisis that could be recommended, if not to President George W. Bush, then to the next U.S. President? It would seem that if Tehran is to be persuaded to suspend its uranium enrichment program, it will need to be offered incentives of an altogether different nature from the ones currently on offer.

The formula outlined below rests on the belief that most Middle East conflicts are closely interlinked and cannot be resolved piecemeal. Iran’s nuclear ambitions, for example, cannot be separated from America’s military presence on its borders, from the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, and from the Islamic Republic’s sometimes tense relations, as a major Shi’a power, with the Sunni-led Arab states of the Gulf, indeed with Saudi Arabia itself.

A comprehensive package for resolving these tensions and conflicts might, it is argued here, have a chance of success — certainly a far better one than the current attempts.

Israel, for example, wants to eliminate any possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons — an aim shared by the United States and by a sizeable part of the international community. Whether one believes it or not, the received wisdom is that a nuclear-armed Iran would be profoundly destabilizing of the international order, would lead to a rash of proliferation, and might even allow terrorists to get their hands on weapons of mass destruction.

Some Israelis go so far as to claim that an Iranian bomb would pose an “existential threat” to their country, even though Israel itself has a large nuclear arsenal, estimated at over 200 warheads, and the air and sea systems to deliver them.

But even if one dismisses the Israeli claim as a self-serving exaggeration, it is clear that a nuclear-armed Iran would be a formidable rival to both Israel and the United States, restricting their freedom of action and challenging their regional hegemony.

The key question, therefore, is this: What strategic price would the U.S. and Israel be prepared to pay to induce Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions?

Would the United States, for example, consent to withdraw its forces from Iraq, and even from its bases in the Gulf States, reverting to its earlier, less provocative, “over-the-horizon” military presence? Would Israel, in turn, agree to allow the emergence of an independent and viable Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, with Arab East Jerusalem as its capital?

Barack Obama, the Democratic presidential candidate, has vowed to end the war in Iraq and withdraw American troops. This would clearly be a wise move, very much to America’s advantage, since the Iraq war has been an unmitigated catastrophe. Indeed, many experts would argue that, rather than enhancing the security of the United States and its allies, the U.S. military presence in Iraq and in the Gulf breeds opposition, creates insecurity and spawns terrorists.

Equally, many of Israel’s closest friends and well-wishers — including, most recently, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France — have argued that the creation of a Palestinian state would not only be greatly to Israel’s advantage, but would be the very best guarantee of its long-term security.

So, if this analysis is correct, then a U. S. military withdrawal and an Israeli green light for a Palestinian state would not be such a heavy price to pay if Iran were, in exchange, to end its uranium enrichment.

It is sometimes forgotten that Iran, under the late Shah, was one of Israel’s closest allies, and that Israel’s covert arms deliveries to Iran during the eight year Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) allowed the Islamic Republic to resist Iraq’s assault. President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s anti-Israeli diatribes are not driven by anti-Semitism, but by outrage — shared by much of the Muslim world — at Israel’s cruel and oppressive treatment of the Palestinians under its rule.

If, instead of crushing the Palestinians, Israel were to help them achieve their national goals, much of the poison would be drained from the Iranian-Israeli relationship and a renewed friendship might even ensue.

There remains the matter of Iran’s relations with the Gulf States. Iran fears that it will be attacked from U.S. bases in the Gulf, while the Gulf States, in turn, fear that Iran will use the local Shi’a communities to undermine the current political order. These mutual fears could be allayed by a security pact between Iran and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Gulf States would pledge not to allow their territory to be used for an attack on Iran, while Iran would pledge not to incite the local Shi’a communities against their Sunni rulers.

It is tempting to speculate how Tehran might react if, instead of being offered aircraft parts, an end to sanctions against its banks and the uncertain rewards of diplomatic engagement, it were offered a U.S. military withdrawal from the region, the creation of a Palestinian state within a wider Arab-Israeli settlement, and a security pact with the Gulf States.

What if the next American president were to adopt a plan of this sort as his foreign policy priority?

In such circumstances, it is unlikely that Iran would still feel the need for nuclear weapons. The threat of a devastating war would be transformed into a win-win situation for all parties. Only diehard warmongers — in Tel Aviv, Washington and Tehran — would lose out.

Patrick Seale is  author of “The Struggle for Syria”; also, “Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East”; and “Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire.” © 2008 Patrick Seale