Israelis voted with an obsession: the occupation. The results were mixed, but the overall picture is a shift to the right: use of force, not reason. Right wing parties which oppose withdrawal from the West Bank and East Jerusalem won the majority of parliamentary seats.

Israel’s Likud party leader Benjamin Netanyahu listens to Gideon Sa’ar, a member of the Knesset, during a party meeting at the Israeli parliament in Jerusalem February 11, 2009. REUTERS/Baz Ratner

It was not that simple. Despite the larger victory of the right, Kadima, the centrist party which supports a two-state solution, won a narrow numerical victory over the right-wing Likud. In a parliament of 120 contested seats, Kadima won 28 parliamentary seats and hard-line Likud won 27. The impressive scores of Kadima reveal the resilience of the peace camp and cautions peacemakers not to resort to Valium in desperation.
The far-right party, Ysrael Beiteinu, won an impressive 15 seats. Traditionally, the Labor party has been active in the peace process. This left-of-center party scored only 13 seats, a fourth place.

Since results are close, it is not yet clear which party will be asked to form the next government. It is up to the president of the state to choose the party which appears likely to succeed in forming a cabinet.

If called to action, the Likud leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, would be able to create a right-wing cabinet with 66 seats. But if Tzipi Livni, the leader of Kadima, is asked to put together a cabinet coalition, she will have to include one or two opposition parties. With 15 seats, Lieberman, the leader of Beiteinu, may play the role of king maker in the formation of the next coalition government.

Should Israel form a Likud-led government, the new regime will have no trouble in slowing down the peace process. These elections are taking place when Palestinians are divided, America is in a crisis, the Arab League is split and Iran is in transition to a new government. Nonetheless, in a position of power and under international pressure, Likud’s Netanyahu, may soften and negotiate peace defensively.

Netanyahu — known as Bibi — sees the Middle East through Iran. Bibi threatens to militarily confront Tehran and decimate its ally, Hamas. His image in the Arab world is negative. Bibi suits a national mood of distrust and fear. His wide political constituency will serve him.

Tzipi Livni represents a new face. She appeals to the young, to women and to many Israelis who yearn for change. She has made an impression on some Arab leaders. As she campaigned on a peace platform, she is Washington’s favorite.

The next cabinet may be formed through a painful process of compromise: a co-habitation of Likud and Kadima. The new government may assume the challenge of pursuing peace while taking a tough stance on territorial concessions.

The role of Palestinians in changing Israeli politics remains crucial. To achieve their goals, Palestinians should review their priorities, placing national unity first (reconciliation of Hamas with Fatah), conducting new elections, forming a new government and probing public opinion on peace terms through a national referendum.

The idea of a national referendum was floated by a popular Palestinian who is now in jail. Washington’s new envoy to the Middle East, George Mitchell, is looking for a way to generate momentum for the stalled peace process. He might find an opportunity in an unlikely place: an Israeli prison, where a popular Palestinian leader, with a potential to be the Mandela of Palestine, is sequestered. His name is Marwan Barghouti.

Mitchell could facilitate the ongoing back-channel negotiations for the release of Barghouti, in return for the release of the Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit from Hamas. Progress on this front would stabilize Gaza and unify Palestinians.

Back to the elections. When Israelis are asked why they voted against peace they reveal a growing desire to vote hawks into power. Palestinians voted for Hamas in 2006 with the same idea in mind.

Ironically Hamas leaders last week declared that they are more likely to strike a deal with Israel if the post-election government is Kadima led rather than Likud led. The preference of Hamas to make a deal with Kadima deserves reflection.

Many parallel stories on the subject of missed opportunity can be cited on the Israeli as well as on the Palestine side. This “opportunity” story goes back in time several decades. In the 1970s, when the Palestine Liberation Organization was struggling to establish a secular Palestinian state, Israel helped create Hamas to weaken the PLO. Now, in contrast to the past, the secular side of Palestinians is what Israel is supporting and the Islamic side is what Israel is committed to fighting viscerally to the bitter end.

Arabs and Israelis have the same knack for repetitive missing of opportunity, for redundant blame of the adversary and for failing to acknowledge the sinkhole in one’s own backyard.

To achieve their political goals, Palestinians do not have to dream of change in the occupier’s behavior. They have the key in their hands: civic resistance. Similarly the Israelis can achieve the security they desperately seek in simply withdrawing from the occupied Arab territories.