Afghanistan held its parliamentary elections last Saturday for only the second time since the Taliban were ousted from power. All 249 seats were at stake in the Wolesi Jirga or “House of the People,” which is the lower house of Afghanistan’s bicameral legislature. The Wolesi Jirga has the most power to override both the Meshrano Jirga (House of the Elders) and the president with a two-thirds majority.

The weak voter turnout and the massive reporting of irregularities and fraud during the elections speaks volumes about the stability of the fledgling government — that the Jirga of Hamid Karzai will not save Afghanistan and nor will the Afghan or the international Jirgas.

No one, no matter how brilliant, can achieve any significant results with the current U.S. plan in place. The problem in Afghanistan is the impossibility of the mission. The United States is pursuing a nation-building strategy with counterinsurgency tactics – that is, building a nation at the barrel end of a gun.

Neither can Iraq be used as a model for “winning” in Afghanistan. It’s not even clear whether there has been any meaningful “victory” in Iraq.  Baghdad is still incapable of forming a government and protecting the “green zone.” The best that can be said is that in the summer of 2006, 2500 civilians were showing up dead every month, and now it is a tenth of that (still a lot).

General Petraeus, who was “King David” in Iraq, is now expected to work the same “magic” he supposedly worked in Iraq but, as in Iraq, he will only succeed in creating the impression of success so as to allow the U.S. to begin withdrawing “with honor.” Petraeus knows that the appearance of success is more important than real success, which is impossible in these ill-conceived “wars.” He is a political general who knows how to work the system.

I don’t think that the forthcoming elected Afghan parliament will have more moral authority than the present one. And moreover, in a multi-ethnic country like Afghanistan, it is probably not the best way to solve all problems by a simple majority of the vote. It needs much subtler instruments to appease all the parties involved in the process of state-building. And this task cannot be limited to neutralizing the most notorious factions like the Taliban by force.

The problem faced by the U.S. in Afghanistan is the same one it faced in Vietnam 40 years ago, that of supporting a corrupt and incompetent regime against the Vietcong, a group of well-disciplined guerrilla fighters dedicated to their cause and supported by the well-organized North Vietnamese regime, which was in turn supported by China and the Soviet Union.

It is true that the Taliban have no external support comparable to that given to Vietnam by China and the old USSR, but they are inspired by the intense feeling that they are engaged in a war with those who — they imagine — want to destroy their religion. Moreover, they consider themselves the vanguard of the Pashtun nation, which comprises about 40 percent of the Afghan population. They also provided the top political leadership to Afghanistan from the 18th century, through the Durrani monarchy, and they look down on the northern Tajik and Hazarah ethnic groups (who speak dialects of Persian). Although probably only 20-30 percent of Afghan Pashtuns view the Taliban favorably, more may admire the Taliban as a group that stands up for Afghanistan’s independence from the Western nations now occupying it. Therefore, the Taliban are driven by feelings of tribal ambition as well as religion.

If the U.S. does not want to be drawn into a Vietnam-style quagmire in Afghanistan — which, be it remembered, is not only much bigger than Iraq but has a much more daunting mountainous terrain than Iraq, which is mostly flat plain—it will need to call for an agreement with the Taliban of Pakistan, not those of Afghanistan.

They are the Taliban of the decision and the definitive word. This leading faction represents an actual morphing of key Taliban forces with al-Qaeda, making it virtually impossible to distinguish between them. The rest of the Taliban in Afghanistan are composed of drug traffickers, warlords, and criminals.

The U.S. can reach out to the Pakistani Taliban if Pakistan can be turned into a sort of “reconciliation safe haven.” Pakistani officials have already said they can deliver the network of Sirajuddin Haqqani, an ally of al-Qaeda who runs a major part of the insurgency in Afghanistan, into a power-sharing arrangement.

 Negotiation with the Taliban should not mean giving Sirajuddin Haqqani or Mullah Omar a position in the Afghan Cabinet or passing money to buy loyalty from the Taliban. Instead, it should mean doing everything possible to endow the local authorities with the ability to reach into the villages, allowing each district and locality to have enough security so that they can form local jirgas, determine their own needs, and seek partnerships with the authorities — assisted by international aid — to extract themselves from the yoke of poverty and insecurity and from the coercion of the extremists.

 Furthermore, this agreement will allow the United States to help isolate al-Qaeda elements from those who feel obliged to join the Taliban insurgency under threat or in return for favors and money. More importantly, by negotiating with the “enemy,” the engagement could create a good picture of the United States in local eyes. This strategy will ultimately be much less costly than any other short-term tactics, which can only prolong our common agony and strengthen the hands of al-Qaeda. g

Jamal Bittar is professor of Interdisciplinary Studies at The University of Toledo in Toledo, Ohio.