At a time when the human spirit in Egypt is braving the odds, standing up against tyranny and for freedom and basic human rights, the Obama administration shows little support for the political needs and internal pressures of the Egyptians. This non-response from the Obama White House has made Egyptians increasingly critical of the position Washington is taking and has created more anti-American sentiment on the streets.
People continue to flood into ‘Tahrir square’, calling for the end of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year rule, in Cairo February 8, 2011. REUTERS |
But where is the so-called democracy and freedom that the U.S. government has been calling for since the first Gulf war? Will we stand by the Egyptian people in their fight to gain the same rights that we enjoy? Will the United States be a beacon for those losing their lives in the name of democracy? Sadly, the answer is a resounding “no.” The West is not interested in individuals in the East. And when the people of the East adopt the Western vision, the West abandons them. This is why the United States does not have credibility in the Middle East and is seen as hypocritical. The United States will continue to support strategically valuable allies over the spread of democracy. U.S. foreign policy has always had a set of criteria for democracy in the Middle East. Washington coasts on the complacent and erroneous assumption that the stability of the autocratic regimes of the Middle East could at least protect U.S. national security. Therefore, democracy has disappeared in the fog of imperialism, behind the clouds of self-advantage and under the dirty rug of hidden goals and intentions.
The narrow and myopic policy focus in Washington since 1979 has been on servicing the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel with big money, equipment and training, without giving the Palestinian and the Syrian peace tracks the attention they deserve. Meanwhile, reliant on Egypt’s pacification, Israel has gone wild in annexing the occupied Syrian Golan Heights and a good part of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The 1978 Sadat-Begin peace process was the beginning of the end of real hope for the Arabs. Once the treaty was signed and the Sinai was returned to Egypt, Israel believed it was not obligated to return any further territories. Resolution 242 called on Israel to return “territories” occupied in the 1967 war, not “the territories” or “all territories.” Israel could thus claim that it had returned territories – the Sinai – and did not have to worry about other territory occupied in war.
Israel and its closest allies in the U.S. Congress are most worried about the possibility that, without a strong and reliable hand overseeing any transition, the Muslim Brotherhood, whose policy platform has long called for the renunciation of the 1979 Camp David Accords, could emerge as a major player, if not a dominant force, in any new regime. That fear was strongly and repeatedly expressed in the first Congressional hearings held about the situation in Egypt Wednesday. The Obama administration is likewise worried about retribution from the pro-Israel lobby should they advocate and assist real regime change in Egypt.
While the government of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has appeared increasingly resigned to Mubarak’s demise, senior officials in Jerusalem have made little secret of their hope that Suleiman, with whom they have cultivated a close relationship and who has helped handle relations with the Palestinians, might succeed him.
Suleiman, who served as Mubarak’s intelligence chief until his appointment as vice president last week, reportedly told Egyptian newspaper editors that there could be a “coup” unless the anti-Mubarak demonstrations ceased and the protesters entered into dialogue with his regime. Thus far, leaders of the rallies, which marked their 16th day Wednesday, have demanded that Mubarak step down before they take part in the talks.
Suleiman, who has made little secret of his antipathy for democratic reforms in the past, also reportedly warned the editors that failure to resolve the impasse could result in chaos that would unleash “dark bats of the night …to terrorize the people.” Suleiman is known to have been trained by the CIA. He is but a shadow of Mubarak.
Until Wednesday, Washington had appeared to support Suleiman’s role as overseer of the transition process. But in a teleconference Wednesday an administration official said “I think it’s important to be clear that the United States has never gone out and said Vice President Suleiman is the right person or passed any judgment on who should be in charge with respect to the government in terms of leading this transition process. We haven’t focused on personalities in that sense. What we’ve focused on are our expectations with respect to meaningful, concrete outcomes.”
Any distancing from Suleiman is certain to make an already-jittery Israel, whose defense minister, Ehud Barak, held high-level talks with U.S. officials here Wednesday, increasingly nervous.
The popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt have been miraculous. The masses have discovered the power of coordinated, collective action in a new era of digital communication. Arabs will never be the same: fear of the ruler has dissipated from the streets of many capitals. The youth want jobs and justice. But the road to freedom and equality is long and steep.
And as we see governments fall and rise with a new face, we must keep in mind that the Arab army is not impressed with street demonstrations.
In the Arab world, virtually all political rulers live in the shadow of the military. How the military deals with change is crucial. In Tunisia, political change has reached a plateau. There is a new government which is run by a prime minister who was close to the deposed President Ben Ali. Life is returning to normal. The army backs the new government. People are hoping that the newly formed national salvation cabinet will lead the country to a new political order. After this dramatic intifada, time will tell how life will be for Tunisians.
So far, Egypt largely follows the Tunisia model, with one key difference: the massive presence of the Egyptian military covertly intimidates the opposition and tries to limit demands for change. The sequence of events is more complicated. An uprising shakes the system. The president retreats, but stays in office. A new leader from the old regime is appointed as vice president. The VP effectively replaces a weakened figurehead. A new cabinet, largely from the military, is formed. Timid concessions are made. The opposition examines concessions and assesses the cost of continuing the struggle, knowing well that the army has the last word.
The Egyptian army is ascendant now because it has a monopoly on the use of force. The military has covert commitment to the old regime and some vested interest in a corrupt political order. And lastly, the army depends on Washington as a major donor.
Washington’s heavy investment in the Egyptian army makes it defensive about this client. Observe how kind Washington is in describing the army action, and how polite it is to Mubarak. In contrast, witness how negative Washington is in depicting the Muslim Brotherhood, a party that has been banned from political activity for decades. The fatal flaw of the Muslim Brotherhood, as many Americans see it, is mixing religion with politics. It is as though America were free of religious fundamentalism.
Anxiety about future relations between Cairo and Tel Aviv has sucked up much of the enthusiasm of Washington for an inconvenient Arab awakening. Washington’s misreading of this awakening could derail it and deepen the anger of Arab masses toward Uncle Sam. However, giving this awakening the benefit of the doubt could immensely serve U.S. national interest and cement regional peace.
The Egyptian street has voted. Mubarak has lost.
That he had the absolute arrogance to refuse to step down as we went to press is infuriating. We stand with the Egyptian people calling for his immediate departure from power and the end of his entire regime’s reign of terror.
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