A Palestinian refugee plays in front of homes rebuilt by UNRWA, the U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees, which were destroyed in fighting in 2007, in Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp, northern Lebanon, in this April 19, 2011 file photo. The border protests on May 15, 2011, in which Israeli gunfire killed at least 13 people, were a reminder that the plight of 4.5 million Palestinian refugees, often ignored in interim peace deals, lies at the core of an Arab conflict with Israel that has reverberated across the Middle East and beyond for decades. REUTERS/Omar Ibrahim

Palestinian youth are asking how the popular democratic
uprisings in Arab countries can inform their national struggle. They launched
the first intifada in 1987 and fueled the second intifada in 2000, and they
believe they have a role to play in the Arab youth uprisings calling for
democratic changes. Palestinian political and civil society organizations are
also seeking answers to this question. The answers cannot be found abroad; they
can only be found in an understanding of the Palestinian condition, which
differs significantly to that of Arab states.

Palestinians are the only Arab people without a state. Each
of its dispersed parts faces different circumstances including settler
colonialism, stifling siege, national and racial discrimination, refugee status
and Diaspora. Thus, the national cause is inseparable from the democratic
imperative. Beginning in 1993, the Oslo accords institutionalized the
fragmentation of the Palestinian people. As a result, many issues need analysis.
This includes a post-Oslo national agenda; the lack of a unified national
leadership endorsed by the majority of Palestinians; the absence of overarching
legislative and executive institutions; the splits in the national movement.

Since Oslo, the institutions of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) have been marginalized and effectively absorbed into the
Palestinian Authority, the self-governing body with limited powers established
in 1994. Meanwhile, the PLO’s sectoral and professional associations — the mass
and trade union organizations of students, women, workers, engineers, teachers,
writers and journalists, among others — gradually lost the role they used to
play of engaging all parts of the Palestinian people in the national struggle
for liberation. The institutions and mechanisms that used to connect the
Palestinian national movement to the Palestinian people in the 1970s and 1980s
gradually eroded. The result has been the fraying of the fabric that used to
bind the struggle for national, democratic and human rights.

Reconstituting the Palestinian national movement

The Palestinians’ aspirations for self-determination,
liberation and democracy will remain unfulfilled unless they can reconstitute
their national movement. How can this be rebuilt on representative foundations,
re-engaging its constituents in historic Palestine and beyond? A review of the
PLO’s experience during the first three decades of its existence suggests some
key issues that must be taken into account so as to move forward.

All parts of the Palestinian people inside historic
Palestine and beyond need to be represented in a way that relates to the
specificities of each Palestinian community. In other words, the Palestinian
National Council should encompass the immediate demands as well as the
socio-economic and political challenges facing each of the major three
different Palestinian components. The Palestinian citizens of Israel are
working against racial discrimination and for national rights as a minority.
Meanwhile, Palestinians in the West bank and Gaza Strip are struggling against
the settler colonial occupation of their land and the siege. Similarly,
Palestinians in the Diaspora are seeking to keep alive their right of return to
their homeland and to end government security surveillance of the refugee camps
in the countries where they live, as well as to have their civil rights
acknowledged.

These distinct sets of rights compose the elements of the
struggle of Palestinians for self-determination and freedom. It is in the
interest of the entire Palestinian people that the occupation should end, that
discrimination should cease and the right of return be realized. Taken
together, the fulfillment of these rights would address the historic injustice
inflicted on the Palestinians. The only time when conflict arose is when one
part of the Palestinian people acted to address its own immediate demands,
reducing the Palestinian cause to an end of occupation of territories occupied
in 1967. This is why many felt that the Oslo accords served to fragment the
Palestinian people by ignoring their history prior to 1967.

Representative mechanisms

The mechanisms for democratic representation present a
challenge. How each segment of the Palestinian people can participate in an
election to choose representatives to best address their interests in the PNC
must be studied carefully, evaluating the best and most appropriate historical
examples. This could range from direct elections, as in the occupied
Palestinian territories for the Palestinian Legislative Council, to Internet
voting in the Diaspora, to other ways that can be devised and agreed upon.

There will be greater challenges among refugees and exiles
as well as for the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Although, for example, the
records of the UN agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA) can be used among
refugee communities in Arab countries in drawing lists of those eligible to
vote and stand for elections in the Diaspora, would Palestinians in Jordan be
willing to identify themselves as Palestinians to vote, at a time when Jordan
is beginning to withdraw citizenship from Jordanians of Palestinian origin?
Palestinians citizens of Israel would also face serious repercussions, if they
take part in electing their representatives to the PNC. However, other ways
could be found to make their views known. In the past, they stated their needs
and demands and these were taken into account without their having to be
official members of the PNC.

It is worth recalling that the PLO’s Basic Law does state that
the members of the PNC should be directly elected. However, the PNC relied
largely on the quota system, as did some of the mass organizations,
apportioning seats between the political factions according to a set quota —
something along the lines of Fatah having half the seats plus one in the
secretariat, with the rest distributed to members of other groups. The only
exception was the Palestinian writers and journalists union, where Fatah did
not have a majority and where the general secretary was independent.

The quota system served to paralyze the PLO’s institutions
and limit the healthy competition and dynamics needed to ensure real
representatives of Palestinian constituencies, and that might have been
achieved using other methods such as proportional representation. Direct
elections were carried out in some branches of the students’ union (as is still
the case in the universities of the West Bank and Gaza Strip) and occasionally
in the branches of other unions, although those outside the occupied Palestinian
territories were forced to conform to the quota system. These elections were
also used as a way of sidestepping host government concerns about the
Palestinian status of their residents — as well as Arab governments’ fear that
their own people might demand elections. In theory, the democratic wave ushered
in by the Arab revolutions should make it easier for Palestinian communities to
hold direct elections in host countries.

Guaranteeing political and intellectual pluralism

No Palestinian political or intellectual contribution should
be excluded from the PNC. This used to be the case within the PLO pre-Oslo, and
political viewpoints ranged from left to right and from Islamist to secular.
This was one of the PLO’s strengths: Every Palestinian had the right to have
their voice heard and express views and opinions. All the political
organizations of the PLO (including those of the left, Fatah and the
pan-nationalists) had their own publications, autonomous civic and military
organizations, security apparatuses and ideological standpoints.

Of course, pluralism doesn’t mean that each political party
can do what it likes; they must function within the charter. In the pre-Oslo
PNC, there were lengthy meetings to decide on national issues in order to reach
a consensus. Each of the components of the Palestinian people must take into
account the interests of the other components. For example, if a decision is
made to opt for armed resistance, this should specify the areas where it can be
carried out (e.g. areas under direct Israeli military occupation). There have
to be certain restrictions on action, including those provided by international
law, which recognizes the right of occupied peoples to resist but bars attacks
against civilians whether by states or individuals.

The two authorities operating since 2007 in the West Bank
and Gaza have become less tolerant of freedoms of speech, association and
expression than used to be the case. Both have acted to restrict the rights of
those sympathizing with the party in opposition (Fatah sympathizers in the Gaza
and Hamas sympathizers in the West Bank). It is hoped that the recent
Hamas-Fatah rapprochement will reaffirm and strengthen democratic institutions
and redirect energies towards the struggle for self-determination.

Previously, PNC meetings had to be held annually and the
Executive Committee was elected every three years. However, the last legitimate
meeting (i.e. held according to the basic law of the PLO) was the one in
Algiers in 1988 that declared the Palestinian state. The enforced paralysis of
the PNC violates the PLO’s Basic Law. Those who bet on the Palestinian
Authority becoming a Palestinian state should critically examine the
consequences, particularly the marginalization of the PLO, the fragmentation of
the Palestinian people, the continued colonization of the West Bank, including
East Jerusalem, and the siege of the Gaza Strip. Given the broad agreement
between Fatah and Hamas to end the division within the national movement, it is
hoped that a national strategy will be thought through that does not pin false
hopes on the United States, or rely on pointless negotiations without a clear
end result and without a framework grounded in international legitimacy.

The push for a declaration of a Palestinian state in
September will just create another façade. There are also dangers. The PLO now
has observer status at the UN, the only national liberation organization to
have that status. What will happen to the PLO when the UN recognizes a
Palestinian state, one that is under occupation without sovereignty over
territory, borders, skies, and without the necessary aspects of statehood, and
that jeopardizes the right of return? This is exactly what Israeli Prime
Minister Benyamin Netanyahu is seeking: A state with temporary borders.

Ensuring democracy

The democratic rights of the Palestinians must be respected.
This includes the right to vote and run for office; freedom of expression,
opinion and association; and regular elections for political and union
leadership. Democratization is especially important to revitalize and rebuild
the mass organization, trade and professional unions. If they are to be really
effective they need genuine grassroots participation and not simply be dictated
to by political parties that impose the quota system. Otherwise, Palestinians
will lose the most powerful mechanism of linking them horizontally, that is,
across borders, ideologies and socio-economic status.

An example might be useful here. In the wake of Israel’s
invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the General Union of Palestinian Writers and
Journalists suffered from a political split that was brought about first by a
split within Fatah in 1983, then by the division of the PLO into two major
camps. Considerable efforts were made to reunify the writers and journalists
union as a step toward reunifying the PLO. A successful writers union
conference was held in Algiers in 1987, which was also used to test the
feasibility of holding a PNC meeting that would reunify Palestinian ranks. The
latter was reconvened shortly afterwards with the participation of all
political parties, signaling the reunification of the national movement.

Palestinians must ensure that the national movement is
grounded in secular and inclusive foundations, so as to encourage debate,
accountability and constructive opposition (it should be noted that secular and
atheist are not synonymous, and in this case “civil” is a less loaded
term). The Arab revolutions and uprisings can be a source of strength for the
Palestinians in developing these foundations. Indeed, there are new discourses
among Islamist movements. Some, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt, have come to accept the idea of a civil state instead of an Islamic
state. Tunisians are discussing a secular constitution and 50 percent
representation of women in national institutions and political parties. This is
where the Arab revolutions can be a source of strength for the Palestinians.

So as to ensure that the aspirations of the entire
Palestinian people are addressed, it may be necessary to review the Palestinian
National Charter. It was written in the 1960s in a completely different world
and time, especially in terms of its language and the present-day emphasis on
notions of transparency, democracy, human rights and citizenship. The Cold War
is over, and Palestinians need a document that communicates to the young and
that they can relate to.

Such a revision would involve transcending the Oslo
agreements, which contributed to the fragmentation of the Palestinian people
and the marginalization of the PLO and provided cover for Israel’s settler
colonialist policy. Many Palestinians, including political leaders, believe
this should be done. If the PLO is rebuilt, it should have headquarters outside
Palestine, with the Palestinian Authority becoming one of its departments
confined to “municipality type” functions (health, education, sewage,
etc). It should have no political functions. Indeed, part of rebuilding the PLO
would necessitate re-defining the PLO-PA relationship and clarifying their
relations and responsibilities. This is not because the PA is on the threshold
of becoming a state — far from it — but in order to free the national movement
from Israeli pressures, constraints and humiliation and from the blatant bias
of the United States and the European Union toward Israel.

Some may fear that aid may be cut off and the 160,000 PA
employees and their families will suffer as a result. This is why Palestinians
need a strong PLO. The PA’s employees would have to be the responsibility of
the PLO. But one cannot hold the basic rights of the Palestinian people hostage
to the PA’s employees. Arab countries can easily make up for any cuts in the
aid the PA gets from the West. As for Israel, let it shoulder the burdens of
its occupation, instead of having, as it does now, the cheapest occupation in
history, to quote PA President Mahmoud Abbas (see Lamis Andoni, “The PA’s
ultimate act of resistance,” Al Jazeera English, 7 December 2010).

To sum up, Palestinian trade unions and professional
associations must be rebuilt so as to revive the structures that reunify the
Palestinian body politic, facilitate its roots in healthy social and cultural
development and reconstitute the national movement. This is the priority and all
other issues are secondary.

A new national movement or a renewed PLO?

The question is often posed as to whether it is preferable
to rebuild the PLO’s institutions or to build a new movement. In theory, either
option could work as long as it incorporates the principles outlined above. The
reality is different. Any attempt to establish a new national movement would
rouse political and factional fears, given the geopolitical split that has
resulted in one government in Gaza and another in the West Bank since 2007.
Although both governments function under occupation and siege, they have agreed
in late April 2011 to proceed to end the division and, hopefully, to discuss
with the whole body of the national movement a common strategy to confront
Israeli policy, instead of using their respective security apparatuses to
control the Palestinian citizens in their domain.

Any call to sidestep the PLO in favor of a new national
movement would aggravate an already acute polarization and lead to increased
reliance on external centers of power with private agendas. It is therefore
preferable to focus on rebuilding the PLO despite the stagnation and
marginalization it has suffered. The arguments in favor of this approach
include:

1. There is a national consensus to rebuild the PLO and make
its institutions inclusive, even though there is as yet no agreement on a
timetable and implementation mechanisms.

2. The PLO has a legacy of militant struggle that can be
built upon. It is important to revive and celebrate this legacy especially
since many Palestinian youth know very little about it. They have no first hand
knowledge of the rise of the Palestine resistance in the late 1960s and 1970s
in the Diaspora and within Israel or of the steadfastness of the resistance
movement in Lebanon in the face of Israeli attacks. Some were too young or not
even born during the first intifada.

3. The PLO is recognized internationally and by Arab
countries as “the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people.” Obtaining Arab and international recognition for a new movement
would certainly not be easy, to say nothing of securing wide-scale Palestinian
recognition.

4. The PLO and its factions played a pivotal role in
supporting and organizing the movement’s sectoral federations, trade unions and
professional associations. These in turn secured a broad social and popular
base for the PLO and mobilized the mass of Palestinians in the national
struggle, forging organizational linkages between Palestinian communities
despite their geographic separation. When PLO institutions were marginalized,
these associations were likewise transformed into ineffective, unrepresentative
and nationally insignificant bureaucratic structures, unable to speak up for
the interests of the social segments they were supposed to represent.

Realigning the national and social agenda

The main message from the Arab uprisings to the Palestinian
people is that the quest for national liberation, democracy and social justice
is intertwined. The first step must be to rebuild the Palestinian national
movement on democratic and inclusive grounds that preserve the unity of the
Palestinian people. In weighing whether Palestinians should seek to rebuild the
PLO or attempt to build a new national movement, it is clear that rebuilding
the PLO would be the most effective path to follow despite its moribund state.
The democratization taking place in the Arab world is of great value and
strength to the Palestinian struggle, and the Palestinian leadership needs to
support and be inspired by it.

In rebuilding the national movement, Palestinians must
realign the national and social agenda and engage with diverse Palestinian
communities. They must account for and incorporate the social, democratic and
national struggles appropriate to the conditions of each community, and derive
inspiration from the values of freedom, equality, social justice and the right
to self-determination.

Jamil Hilal is an independent Palestinian sociologist and
writer, and has published many books and numerous articles on Palestinian
society, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Middle East issues. He edited Across the
Wall (I.B. Tauris, 2010). This essay was originally published by Al-Shabaka,
the Palestinian policy network. The Electronic Intifada, 17 May 2011.