Beirut — In yet another incredibly dangerous turn in the
Middle East, “liberal interventionists” are once again joining forces
with “hawkish” neoconservative voices to advocate for the collapse of
the Syrian regime — sooner rather than later.

Supporters of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad holding a Syrian flag with an image of al-Assad shout slogans outside of a hotel where the opposition activists are gathered for a conference in Antalya, southern Turkey, June 2, 2011. Syrian authorities freed hundreds of political prisoners after Assad issued a general amnesty in response to 10 weeks of protests against his 11-year rule, a Syrian rights group said on Thursday. Syrian dissidents meeting in the Turkish coastal city of Antalya have called on Assad to quit to make way for democracy. REUTERS/Kaan Soyturk

Unlike in the run-up to the disastrous Iraq war, however,
this neo-LiberalCon consensus is gaining the advantage with seemingly few, if
any, credible alternatives posed, save for a weak attempt by the Obama
administration to offer a “grand bargain” for the Syrian regime that
really boils down to four not-so-grand words: “reform or die
fighting.”

Of course, as most of Obama’s advisors know, this is simply
not a credible international roadmap for an embattled regime where its outside
enemies hold such a clear preponderance of power (not to mention occupied
Syrian territory).

Moreover, the Obama “plan” actually offers nothing
positive — no carrots — to the regime or elites that might either entice them
into a real stabilization and transition process or produce enough divisions
within the regime, in the event of a rejection, to boost the position of
soft-liners towards a tipping point (thereby mitigating the prospect of future violence
in any implosion).

As a result of this idea vacuum, the neo-LiberalCon tsunami
grows by the day, publicly eschewing armed, Libyan-style intervention
(although, given past statements, it is likely the neo-con wing privately hopes
for this), and instead posits a policy by powerful external actors that would
accelerate Syria’s internal contradictions and pressures to the breaking point.

One essential problem with this formulation is that the
result, especially for the people of Syria, will likely be even worse than the
kind of civil war that obtains to this day in Libya. As one Syrian activist who
crossed into Lebanon casually told a Western reporter earlier this month, he
could contemplate the need for sacrificing the lives of 2-3 million Syrians for
freedom.

And this is without the increasing prospect of regional war
(and other unintended consequences) that would likely be engendered by such an
“accelerated collapse” approach!

One potentially fruitful avenue has, however, been available
at least since the start of the protests — but its promise has been moving
towards the oft-touted “point of no return” each time the regime
ratchets up the violence and external actors invest more capital (rhetorical,
financial and otherwise) in a policy of accelerated collapse.

In short, rather than only posing the formula of
transitioning out of power or facing extreme isolation, growing unrest and a
possible explosion, the Obama administration, Europe, other Arab states and
Turkey could have — and still can — join together to offer a real roadmap for
immediate stabilization and a medium-term transition towards democratic
benchmarks.

This transition would have to take place, however, within
the context of an aggressive U.S. role to finally return the entire occupied
Golan Heights to the Syrian people (a “’67 borders” proposal
originally promised by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzah Rabin which, unlike the
one proposed recently by Obama, is arguably digestible for the Israeli body
politic, especially given the stated support of key security officials and
military hawks).

Specifically, this would mean:

1) Immediately convening an international conference to
support Syria’s economy;

2) The development of a Marshall Plan, alongside a
relaxation of economic sanctions, to rescue Syria’s currency and smooth the way
for economic reforms that, on their own, would likely hurt far too many Syrians
in the short and medium terms;

3) Publicly committing the Syrian regime to a timetable for
those political reform proposals already tendered by Syrians actually living in
Syria (broad prisoner releases and a pullback by the army first, the setting of
near-term dates for free and fair parliamentary elections, legal reforms to
make the media sector more open and security sector reforms);

4) And a public commitment by the U.S. president and allies
to aggressively expedite the “Syria Track” of negotiations according
to the Rabin terms. Although it is now de rigeur to overlook the history of
recent negotiations (the DNA of the regime makes peace impossible, the
neoLiberalCons reliably argue), Bashar al-Assad’s father almost signed such a
deal in 2000, but Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak got “cold feet”
at the last minute about giving back several hundred meters of shoreline around
Lake Tiberius in the Golan. Not to be outdone, in 2008, the son also came close
to a deal before Israel launched its war in Gaza, greatly angering their
Turkish intermediaries.

Of course, when it comes to the political reforms, things
look perhaps more cloudy, especially to many in the U.S. and Europe.

But forcing an immediate, radical leap to full democracy
would likely be too much for either the regime or many Syrians to reasonably
swallow without collapsing the whole process (at which point one must again
consider the moral and strategic dangers of the “accelerated
collapse” policy).

What’s more, if the West wants to demand, say, a date for
presidential, as opposed to merely parliamentary, elections — thus directly
challenging the Assad rule now rather than helping to guide an indigenous
democratic process to eventually deal with the issue — one needs to look around
the region and think very hard whether we are going to be consistent and demand
exactly the same thing, now, in Bahrain for example (where there is a nominally
elected parliament but the monarchy rules) to say nothing off Saudi Arabia,
Jordan etc.

Either way, at this point — even given the increasingly
wanton brutality of the regime — it still seems reasonable to assert that a
critical mass of Syrians themselves, within the country, would prefer a
concrete plan and commitment — backed by a patient but strong set of external
actors — for a gradual transition towards a range of meaningful democratic
reforms (especially in concert with the other supporting measures), rather than
the alternative track we are likely going down: tens of thousands, perhaps
more, dead and many more lives ruined for a prolonged period of time as in
Iraq.

For the neo-LiberalCons, such an alternative approach may at
first seem anathema. However, I would urge them not only to look closer at the
moral and strategic implications of their current trajectory, but also at the
effect that such an alternative would likely have on the regime collapse
scenario they in fact advocate.

Simply put, a credible roadmap for a way out of the current
mess, in public, would actually help soften the violent effect of any
implosion, should the Assads decide to publicly reject such a proposal made by
a concert of nations.

As we now know from unnamed U.S. officials in the Arab
media, the Obama administration is currently looking at ways to lure key
officials, constituencies and army leaders away from the iron-fist policy
pursued by the Assads in the hope that an Egypt-type scenario may obtain in the
near future.

Without putting positive incentives out there, however, such
an effort is emaciated from the start and unlikely to succeed in the Syrian
context (where the army appears to have greater loyalty to the Assad rule), or
to have much of an effect on the regime’s calculations.

With a concrete set of “carrots,” the wedges we
know exist within the regime and within Syria’s elites would be greatly
exacerbated in the event of a rejection, empowering soft-liners against
hardliners and likely strengthening the former’s ability to gain the upper hand
in mitigating the effects of any eventual collapse, should it come to pass.

Make the Assads and any of their allies that are left within
the country and outside (including key actors like Hizbullah and Hamas) seem
obviously unreasonable and you will have gone a long way towards saving lives
and, hopefully, making the path towards freedom for all Syrians an achievable
and liveable reality.

One final point needs mentioning.

The debate over what to do in regards to Syria marks a
critical turning point for Western pundits and policymakers as well as for the
discipline of international relations in general.

This ideological battle gained particular momentum during
the protests following the disputed presidential election in Iran in 2009 and
has roughly boiled down to a debate over using limited resources to address
underlying grievances (like occupied territory, strategic threats, etc.) or
pursuing a less expensive (and politically more comfortable) policy of
encouraging various “Green Revolutions” — indigenous wedges — in
states that oppose the U.S.

The great “Green” hope is that the regimes in
question would implode a la Communism with a manageable level of pain and
suffering

It remains the preferred route for the neoLiberalCons when
things get hot — especially after the Iraq war soured many on the idea of
direct, armed regime change against relatively weak states.

If the Obama administration continues on the path towards an
“accelerated collapse” policy, I would submit that we will shortly be
facing a definitive, real world test for this battle of approaches.

Should the Syrian regime collapse under growing external
pressures with relatively little violence and usher into power a democratically
elected government — or even an authoritarian one but whose
“behavior” in the region, especially vis-à-vis Israel, is ostensibly
“better” — the neo-liberalCon approach will become vastly more
attractive in Western capitals and among various publics.

I obviously don’t think this is likely — which is why democracy
advocates, I believe, need to jumpstart a conversation about alternative
approaches immediately.

One thing, of course, is absolutely certain, and it is
important to consider very carefully: once again, it is the people of the
region who will bear the overwhelming balance of yet another Great Power
gamble.