In the Arab Spring there is a steady turbulence: dynastic regimes, patriarchal order, fanatic movements and self-serving foreign intervention.

  Over the last century, the entire nation-building process has been dysfunctional. Rulers legitimize people, not the reverse; religion trumps human rights; reactionary political movements generate more problems than solutions.

 But not all obstacles to freedom have been local. When tied to strategic interests, foreign assistance could do more harm than good. Since the end of World War I, the West has had a major hand in appointing and defending loyal kings and presidents in the Arab world.  

 Given the many sources of threats to freedom, it should not be surprising that the fate of revolts in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria is unclear.

 The progress in Tunisia’s struggle has raised expectations. Here, the major barrier to freedom was the ruler. The country is not burdened by tradition, fanatic reformers, and foreign intervention. Tunisia’s modernity and society’s homogeneity facilitated the ousting of President Ben Ali. Reform is in progress.

 In Egypt, the situation is different.  The military, which has deep interest in the economy, remains dominant in the post Mubarak regime.  Religious enterprise feeds on piety: a thriving industry of preaching dulls the mind.  Rival foreign aid policies from the U.S., Europe and Saudi Arabia pressure the new regime to take inconsistent steps for the future. To prevail, youth, women and secular parties will have to continue the struggle.

 Libya is proving more difficult to transform than Egypt. In this tribal society, a peaceful demonstration challenged a ruler who has gone deep in oppression and far in delusions. The ruler has operated as if he owns the nation. With free access to oil wealth, he has managed to foster absolute obedience from the people.  Key figures in the army and the tribes are privileged; with some notable exceptions, these complicit loyalists have defended the status quo. For too long, private initiative was discouraged. Citizens seeking liberty and accountability of public authority had to emigrate. Libya depended on foreign labor to do the creative and constructive work for the nation.

 The people of Libya, impassioned by the media, rushed into a revolution without being sufficiently prepared. There is no strong civic structure to defend the uprising. The rebels needed external assistance. Gaddhafi’s brutal reaction to the rebels — and his record of terrorism — precipitated protective, albeit naïve and wobbly, foreign military intervention. The international community is divided on ways to deal with a ruler whose legitimacy has clearly expired.

 It is hard to predict Libya’s future given a weak rebellion; ethnic division, between the region of the West and the East; and conflicted international intervention.

 Despite their immense differences, Syria and Bahrain have a common feature in governance: rule by a minority. The Republic of Syria is dominated by a Shiite sect: the Alawites rule over a Sunnite majority, while the Bahraini royal family is Sunnite, ruling over a Shiite majority. 

 The sectarian factor in the uprisings of Syria and Bahrain should not be over- emphasized, for the tension between Shiites and Sunnites is more ethno-political than religious. More importantly, the primary problem of the two countries is not the identity of the rulers. The problem is abuse of power.

 The revolt in Syria is a reaction to a failing regime which has been in power for too long. Jails are crowded with political dissidents and the regime has been excessively harsh in responding to the uprising. Syria has a primitive economy, a closed political system and a culturally isolated society. Many Syrians are tired of the regime’s close alliance with Iran and its excessive involvement in Lebanese and Palestinian politics.

 Similarly, in Bahrain, people complain about lack of freedom of dissent, concentration of power in a non-constitutional monarchy, unfair distribution of wealth, and dominance of expatriates. Reformers are jailed and a powerful, secular political party has been banned.

 Syria leads a deceptive rhetoric of resistance against Israel in the region, and Bahrain hosts a provocative, major U.S. naval base. Such contrasting national positions affect foreign policy toward the revolts in both countries.

 But often, politically motivated foreign intervention does more harm than good.  Saudi Arabia and the U.S. aggressively support the Bahraini regime with arms and diplomacy, while Iran actively supports Syria with money and arms.

 The Saudis believe that a change of regime in Bahrain would negatively impact Riyadh’s stability. The U.S. has guaranteed the security of all Gulf countries at a high moral and monetary cost, for both the client states and patron. Projected arm sales to the Gulf States are historically unprecedented: 60 billion dollars to Saudi Arabia alone.

 The stability of Syria is also tied to the region’s security.  There is growing fear that ending the Assad dynasty would threaten the entire Eastern Mediterranean, including Lebanon and Israel. The current hawkish Israeli cabinet is against seeing Syria’s burdened regime removed from power.

 Iran would be weakened, and Iraq may be further destabilized. Yemen brings another set of dynamics: a poor and tribal-based country with multiple domestic conflicts and an open field for international agents of terror and counter terror. The regime is about to fall; to fill the political vacuum, both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have already rushed to support elements of the status quo. The Yemini reformers are pleading with Washington to be allowed to participate in the shaping of the future. Will Washington listen?

 While its pace is unpredictable, Arab awakening is irreversible. The four threats to freedom — dynasties, patriarchy, fanatic movements and foreign intervention —fuel the turbulence of the Arab Spring.