Lebanon and Syria are close and intertwined: demographically, geographically, culturally, politically and historically. Lebanon was carved partially out of Syria in 1920. Every other Lebanese person has a relative, a business partner or a friend in Syria.

If the uprising in Syria is a process of genuine renewal, Lebanon is bound to benefit. But if the Syrian rebellion is a downward spiral of death, destruction, revenge, kidnapping, external intervention and national divisions, Lebanon is likely to follow Syria through this same dismal spiral.

Headlines in Lebanon this week are about troubles precipitated by events in Syria: kidnapping of alleged pro-Assad Lebanese in Syria, reciprocal kidnapping of Syrians (evoking images of a 15-year civil war) militia muscle-flexing and tourists vacating Beirut hotels. Lebanon suffers when streets and night clubs in the capital city are quiet, and when the main road to the airport is risky. When militia leaders opine that the government is too weak to maintain security and justice, Lebanon shrinks as a state.

The Arab Spring is not only about bad rulers. If Syria changes political regimes without changing a mindset — a sectarian Sunnite autocracy replacing an Alawite dynasty —Lebanon will regress politically.

Despite solid resilience over 17 months of unrest, President Assad is starting to lose control.  His inner circle of power is bound to run out of steam at some tipping point, barring a sudden regional intervention.

One such event could be an Israeli air attack on Tehran’s nuclear installations.  Israel now enjoys maximal strength while its formidable adversary, Syria, is exploding. An Israeli war on Iran, which is likely to engage Iran’s closest Lebanese ally, Hezbollah’s resistance forces, may remobilize the Arab street against Zionism and US military presence in the region. Such remobilization may give President Assad a window of opportunity to return to the theater of Arab “Resistance to the Israeli Occupation in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon”. Despite signs of exasperation with Iran, Israel is not very likely to want to slow down or interfere with the steady erosion of power in Damascus. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Netanyahu keeps threatening to take military action against Iran soon.

Back to Lebanon’s fate post Assad. Most Lebanese complain about the manipulative interference of the Assad regime in their political and economic affairs. And they should. But some feel that Syria’s iron-fist policy has served Lebanon by keeping it from falling apart during recurring crises. A ruthless Damascus rule has limited the power of all political Lebanese communities during the civil war which ended in 1990, and afterward during reconstruction and reunification. 

Lebanon has always had a weak government, a constrained Christian president, an inefficient Sunni Prime Minister, an autocratic Shiite Parliament Speaker, a sectarian power-sharing formula and an anemic national army. By hosting 400,000 Palestinian refugees, being exposed to an ongoing Israeli threat on its southern border, and having to live with a heavily armed political party, Hezbollah, Lebanon could fracture when Syria’s influence suddenly disappears.

The Assad dynasty will not be missed in Beirut, but Lebanon may soon have its own particular Arab Spring in search of a new formula to keep the Lebanese united.

The Lebanese Spring need not target rulers, but ideas. They have to realize that sectarian power sharing is not a tolerable “confessional democracy”. True Lebanon enjoys social freedoms and is industrious, especially it’s Diaspora, which outnumbers local residents. But freedom without security will not sustain a state for too long.

Many of Lebanon’s current political leaders are warlords. It is hard to imagine a strong Lebanon without close cooperation with a future oriented Syrian regime. A united Syria, yearning for democracy, eager to rebuild, willing to forgive,  open to the contributions of all segments of society would be a treasure to its neighbors and a welcome partner to Lebanon.

In a decade or so, it may make good sense for Lebanon to unite with Syria under a federation which will give political and moral space to all segments of society. A Syria-Lebanon federation can survive and prosper only under a democratic system. Only a strong democracy would allow minorities with long records of insecurity to identify with the state first, and second with their religious or ethnic communities.

It will take time for the Lebanese and the Syrians to learn to juggle their identities gracefully and to discover that they are essentially one nation.

The sooner the transition in Syria occurs the easier it will be for Lebanon and for Syria to pull the state together and start on a Spring of ideas. The fear is that a protracted uprising may turn into a regional conflict, fueled by reemerging cold war politics.