The week Central Command Commander Admiral William Fallon resigned under pressure from the Bush Administration.  Fallon, who was in charge of the entire Middle East region, has held critical views on the surge and on Bush’s Iran war-option policy. Other war politicians believe in the magical effects of the surge.

Violence in Iraq has declined from levels of catastrophe to levels of agony. Incidents of violence in Iraq have been cut by 60% since the U.S. troop surge that started in late January 2007. The improvement in the level of security in Iraq has led army chiefs and the American administration to rush to judgment that success in the occupied country is only a matter of time.

It is true that last year’s increase in American troops has allowed soldiers to establish zones of security in previously explosive Baghdad neighborhoods and the Iraqi army has gradually gained some skill and confidence in defending the country against suicidal insurgents.  While the U.S. troop surge in Iraq has reduced American fatalities significantly, it has not significantly reduced the danger to Iraqis. Casualty rates among Iraqis remain high and quality of life continues to be worse than it was before the war. 

The political situation in Iraq remains gloomy. Iraqi leaders are not reconciled; the country is divided; ethnic cleansing does not stop and a national political vision is absent. 

Few observers have analyzed the cause-and-effect connection between the surge and security in Iraq.  Measuring the specific impact of the surge on the war is complicated. Troop increase has been accompanied by massive infusion of money into the pockets of local Sunni militias in recent months. Contractually, the army pays 80,000 Iraqi insurgents 300 U.S. dollars a person per month to join the national security forces.

In this deal we do not know how much money is also being secretly funneled to militia and tribal leaders. We do not know what would happen to security if this military bankrolling were to be withdrawn. Are the alleged results of the surge a function of military perseverance and troop dedication to cause or an artifact of bribery of a nation that is starving?

It is not clear who first conceived of the idea that the U.S. war in Iraq could be won with more U.S. boots on the ground. Some Republicans are counting on the surge to save America from its current dismal failure in Iraq. Twice as many Republicans as Democrats see progress as a result of troop increase. John McCain, the Republican presidential nominee, claims intellectual ownership of the surge in order to promote his campaign. The Arizona senator argues that America is not ready to leave Iraq in the near future; the surge is merely the initial steps in the long distance march toward victory. McCain’s chances for winning the White House are closely tied to the future course of stability in Iraq.

Determination to succeed is admirable, but has it never occurred to the Vietnam-veteran senator that America has already achieved “success” of some sort in Iraq? American forces in 2003 succeeded in knocking off Saddam Hussein, disbanding the army and removing the Baath Party from power. But since those initial achievements, continued war has come at a high collateral cost.

The occupation has demolished the socio-economic infrastructure, displaced about ten percent of the population, allowed massive ethnic cleansing and tolerated the split of the country into three ethno-sectarian zones. Moreover, the U.S. occupation has had the counterproductive effect of mobilizing terrorists worldwide to join forces with local Iraqi insurgents in fighting the U.S.’s unwelcome presence on Arab and Muslim soil.

The military surge was adopted as a last resort to try to reverse the downward spiral in Iraq. Instead of assuming responsibility for the tragic failure of U.S. policy in Iraq, the Bush administration had chosen to allow political and economic conditions to reach catastrophic proportions.

Can a foreign and distrusted military establish security in Iraq and facilitate political reform? Iraq’s political problems can never be solved militarily. As long as Iraq’s neighboring countries are frustrated with U.S. Middle East policy and as long these regimes feel marginalized the U.S. will face insurmountable difficulties in stabilizing Iraq.

Even if the surge policy ultimately succeeds in improving security, how long can the U.S. economy sustain the cost of the Iraq war? The occupation has already cost the U.S. one trillion dollars and according to Joseph Stiglitz, a reputable economist, Iraq expenses are expected to reach three trillion by 2017, in contrast to government estimates.

As the dollar falls, the stock market declines, the housing crisis deepens, the national deficit skyrockets and entitlement reserves (for Social Security and Medicare) erode, as the economic and social security of the nation worsens on every front, how long can we afford to stay in Iraq?

The current cost of Iraq is 12 billion dollars a month. With a monthly twelve billion dollar budget we could insure millions of Americans, protect the national border, reduce teenage pregnancy, divert youth from jail, place students in college, restore security to wretched neighborhoods, improve the quality of education and employ many people who are out of jobs.

In defining national security within the paradigm of force, the U.S. is generating insecurity in its homeland and in the rest of the world. The surge is a symptom of a myopic foreign policy.

Contact author by email at: Grubeiz@comcast.net