Muasher has a hard row to hoe, as a moderate, a democrat, and a peacemaker in the turbulence of the Middle East. This is his memoir as a Jordanian career civil servant and diplomat. It is a book that offers fascinating insight into the actors in Middle Eastern politics and, as well, into the making of U.S. foreign policy for the region.
In that last regard, Muasher confirms, as is quite widely recognized by now, that the Bush administration was firmly committed to going to war against Iraq, even while its charade at the U.N. was going ahead. Saddam Hussein kept yielding to one demand after another, but Bush refused to take yes for an answer.
With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian imbroglio, he provides detailed descriptions of his efforts to try to bring some balance to American interventions, without a great deal of success. He found Colin Powell to be reasonable and capable of nuance, with some of the other figures in the administration, Condoleeza Rice, for example, much less so. No surprise that Powell is no longer there.
Muasher was Jordan’s first ambassador to Israel, and he used his brief time in that position to develop some important insights, though he may have missed some as well. A key learning was that, just as Arabs feel insecure in the face of Israel’s might, Israelis shared the same sense of insecurity in being surrounded by hostile Arab nations.
What it appears that Muasher did not fully appreciate was the degree of Israel’s intransigence both regarding expansionism and the issue of compensation. He describes his futile efforts to arrange for compensation for Jordanians who lost property in the wars. Various subterfuges were employed to deflect claims. This should have not been surprising. Even a member of the Israeli Knesset, Tewfik Tubi, had had his property seized and put under the custodian of “absentee property.” He was an “absentee” sitting as a member of the Knesset! The clear message, through a Byzantine rigamarole, was that, as S.I. Hayakawa once said with regard to the Panama Canal, “We stole it fair and square.”
Muasher apparently failed to appreciate the degree to which settlement “facts on the ground” made any final agreement with Israel ephemeral. The settlement movement in the Occupied Territories followed the French maxim: The appetite grows in the eating.
He is fervently devoted to peace and wants a peaceful settlement in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. He does not discuss the fact that Israel took the occasion of the lull between the two intifadas to engage in a rapid expansion of settlement activity. He also does not address the fact that Israel left Gaza because there were few settlers there and because the terrorist attacks —force, not peaceful negotiations — made Israel pay a higher price to stay than it was willing to do. The West Bank is an entirely different matter, with hundreds of thousands of Israelis living there now.
Let us turn to the question of “the Arab center.” Who is “the center” and what are their interests? Muasher uses the term in two distinct ways. In the first case, he is talking about Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, leading efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement in the region. Continued turmoil in the Territories could threaten Jordan with serious refugee problems which could, among other things, change the ethnic balance of the country. All three countries fear the growing power of Islamist opposition movements resulting from the continuing conflict. They badly want a settlement of the problem. They are essentially status quo powers.
The “bad guy” for Muasher is Syria. Syria is not for the status quo because it wants the return of the Golan Heights. So while the status quo powers fear Hamas and its popularity both in Gaza and in the West Bank, Syria is one of its promoters. Syria also wants to control Lebanon and it uses Hizbullah with that end in mind.
It is hard to see how any negotiated settlement is possible in the face of the “facts on the ground” that all Israeli governments have cultivated. The worst fears of “the Arab center” in this sense are apt to be realized.
Muasher also uses the term to describe efforts within Arab societies and countries to move toward democracy and protection of human rights. He believes in these things personally, but he also sees them as necessary to promote social advancement and to develop a counterweight to the influence of radical Islam. So does the United States.
The baby steps he describes being taken by some of the Arab powers reminds one of the Tennis Court Oath, taken by French aristocrats suddenly impelled to renounce certain privileges in an effort to forestall the coming French Revolution. He proudly relates his efforts in a monarchical-approved Jordanian committee to develop a program and timeline for implementation of reform. Full women’s rights in ten years. However, when the king attempted to get his parliament to pass stricter laws against honor killings, even the king himself was unable to get it through. There are serious questions about the possible attainment of the desired goals in this incremental fashion.
Experiences in both Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that rapid overthrow of authoritarian régimes does not necessarily result in vibrant democracy and respect for minority rights and women’s rights. The slower approach favored by Muasher also faces serious obstacles in this situation. Perhaps the Middle East will have to experience even more misery before the kinds of changes he hopes for can be attained. And perhaps the status quo powers will lose out in the process.
Leave a Reply