Concern about the United States’s image in the Middle East is not simply a frothy concern about being liked, because the United States’s image is crucial to its soft power. When the United States is unpopular in the region, it is more difficult for governments there to cooperate with it and it becomes politically rewarding for leaders to be defiant toward the United States. Equally worrisome, when al-Qaeda’s criticisms of the United States resonate with a majority of the people, this creates a more favorable environment for al-Qaeda to raise funds, recruit, and operate.

At the same time, improving the United States’s image is not an absolute value. Concerns about its image will not and should not be the preeminent factor driving the Obama administration’s policy in the Middle East. Thus, the options proposed here for improving the United States’s image should be seen as a menu to consider in light of a variety of factors at play at any given time.

All other things being equal, the United States should look for opportunities to lighten its military footprint in the region. No matter what U.S. leaders say, these forces will continue to be perceived as having a threatening aspect and as an instrument of U..S dominance.

Simply having a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq will be helpful. Reaffirming the intention to not have permanent bases there is key. Whenever possible, U.S. military and civilian functions should be transferred to multilateral institutions such as the U.N.

Ramping up forces in Afghanistan will likely create some negative reactions. Here again, the more that operations can be imbedded in a multilateral context, in this case the U.N.-sanctioned NATO operation, the less it will be perceived as an instrument of U.S. domination. The fact that the majority of the Afghan people support the presence of U.S. forces there (71 percent in a recent ABC News poll) should also be highlighted, as this provides legitimacy. While the high ratio of military effort to civilian effort in Afghanistan may be a necessity for security, it is also a cost in terms of Afghans’ and others’ perceptions. Thus, counterbalancing efforts on the civilian side of the U.S. presence should be contemplated.

U.S. military bases in the region should be reevaluated in the context of their soft-power costs. Alternatives for policing the Gulf with multilateral forces or with over-the-horizon capabilities should be considered.

Current efforts to link U.S. aid programs to the U.S. military should be reconsidered. While they may arguably have a marginal benefit to the military’s public relations in the region, doing so also enhances the United States’s image as a primarily military, and therefore implicitly coercive, force in the region.

Clearly, the United States is going to sustain its commitment to Israel, as Obama has affirmed. At the same time, the United States can renew its commitment to the peace process. Previous U.S. presidents have at times demonstrated their ability to support Israel and the peace process concurrently. Obama’s expression of empathy for the suffering of the Palestinian people, in addition to his commitment to Israel, is a good step toward finding an inclusive equilibrium that can be the basis for a new approach. Letting the peace process languish will surely be read as defaulting to the status quo, which is perceived as favoring Israel.

Finally, the Obama administration will have to take a hard look at the costs and benefits of pursuing policies that are perceived to be resisting democracy in the region. The perception that the United States thinks it has such an over-riding need for access to oil that people in the region need to be denied democracy is and will continue to be a major source of anger toward the United States and a rallying cry for groups portraying the United States as an imperial hegemon.

The fear that the current regimes in the region hold in place a brittle system that is the only one that can reliably ensure the flow of oil needs to be questioned. Changes to the present configuration that may come with democratization would not necessarily be for the worse.

This is not to say that all such reevaluations proposed here will lead inexorably to changes in policy. While they may improve the United States’s image in the region, there are risks inherent in lessening U.S. military footprint, seeking a more even-handed posture in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or being more encouraging of democracy in the region. Clearly, though, there are also risks inherent in continuing current policies.

The start of a new administration offers unique opportunities. It is a moment for a fresh reevaluation of U.S. foreign policy from all angles. It is also a period when people in the Middle East will be more receptive than usual to seeing the United States in a new way. The enmity people in the region currently feel toward the United States has been costly in many respects. It will behoove the new administration to take these facts into account as it considers the policies that will shape the relationship between the United States and this uniquely troubled part of the world.

Reprinted from the Harvard International Review, 12/22/08.