It took the Palestinian Authority investigative committee, headed by Tayeb Abdel Rahim, 49 sessions, 29 days and 128 hours to investigate the capture of Gaza by Hamas in June 2007. An original name was found for the committee: “The Investigative Committee on the Matter of the Failure of the Confrontation with the Illegal Armed Militias.”

This is fascinating reading material, not only for the Palestinian leadership that kept the report secret until it was leaked, and not only for Palestinian citizens. It paints a terrifying picture of military and political helplessness, internal disputes, family loyalties, a lack of talent and ability to administer military and political forces, a huge waste of money (Mohammed Dahlan received $25 million to build a trained military force, which collapsed in one moment), an absence of coordination between headquarters and the forces in the field, many cases of fear along with some demonstrations of courage, and personal and party hatred between members of Fatah themselves, not to mention toward Hamas.

But beyond the importance of the report as courageous Palestinian accounting, its most significant revelation is that PA President Mahmoud Abbas not only assumed that Hamas was about to take control of Gaza, he also knew it. He had before him all the analyses, the information and the developments that preceded the Hamas takeover. Nonetheless, Abbas did not manage to do anything to prevent the takeover, nothing that might have prevented the present situation in Gaza.

According to the report, the failure was not only functional, but also a case of “ideological neglect,” because since 1994, the year when the PA was established, the authority in general, and Fatah in particular, had not formulated national principles relating to the proper approach of the PA toward movements based on religious platforms, such as Hamas or Islamic Jihad.

When one reads the report in detail — and we can assume that many details were left unrecorded, still buried in the documents submitted to the committee — one can better understand the extent of Israel’s failure in its assumption that it could depend only on the Fatah leadership and on Abbas personally to be able to control the situation, and its hastening to erase Hamas as an organization that could at least conduct daily life in Gaza City and in the Strip.

It also seems that Israel twice missed an historic opportunity to cooperate with Hamas — in practical, even if not in political terms. The first instance was when it boycotted the Hamas government when it was established democratically after the 2006 elections, and the second when the national unity government between Fatah and Hamas was formed.

This report may be the most relevant document for answering the practical question today of whether to conduct negotiations with Hamas, or to continue the two-pronged policy involving ongoing fruitless political talks with Abbas and waging a war without goals against Hamas. Israel and the PA must keep in mind the warning of the authors of this report: If the structure of the Palestinian security forces does not change, if structural and ideological conclusions are not implemented, and if there is no single strategic policy, the Palestinian government is liable to collapse in the West Bank as well.

The report also provides a harsh response to the dilemma of whether to strengthen or weaken Abbas. Developments before and after Hamas’ Gaza takeover suggest that the political process, the diplomatic horizon or its absence, and the Israeli attitude toward the PA, had little effect on the behavior of Abbas or the PA on their strengthening or weakening vis-a-vis Hamas. The internal disputes, the power struggles over jobs and money, the weakness of the central government, the subversion of commanders against their leadership, intergenerational conflicts and family loyalties — all of these overshadowed the ability of any political initiative to turn Abbas into a leader who determines policy and is capable of implementing it.

Has anything changed since last June? Beyond the question of the ability of the government of Salam Fayyad (who was appointed prime minister in July 2007) to fulfill its economic and social role — which it is apparently doing reasonably well — it is doubtful whether anything substantial has changed regarding the ability of this government to implement political or military plans. At the same time, the status of the Fayyad government as responsible de facto for only “two-thirds” of Palestine, while the last one-third, Gaza, is under the total control of Hamas, means that Israel and the PA are in an impossible situation.

Both are unable to disengage from Gaza. Israel can’t, because of its responsibility to conduct the military struggle against Hamas and other organizations that are active in Gaza; the PA because of the national obligation toward the citizens of the Strip, because of the constitutional mandate that made the PA the body responsible for both parts of Palestine; and because of the Oslo Accords, which state that the West Bank and the Strip are one political entity.

Split dialogue

This structure ostensibly calls for splitting the dialogue, at least on Israel’s part: to conduct useless political negotiations with Mahmoud Abbas, on the one hand, and on the other, to conduct negotiations with Hamas for a cease-fire, with all the conditions involved. These include an Israeli commitment to avoid harming civilians and property both in the Strip and in the West Bank, the opening of the Rafah crossing under Hamas supervision and control (with symbolic PA representation) and an end to the closure. Hamas is demanding implementation of this entire package as a condition for a cease-fire, which would mean de-facto recognition of Hamas rule in Gaza, and making Hamas the body responsible for safeguarding the citizens of the West Bank against Israel.

But such an agreement, as tempting as it may be for achieving quiet in Sderot,  Ashkelon and the communities between them, requires another strategic decision: Is Israel willing to give its consent and sponsorship to the dismantling of Palestine into two states, taking away from Abbas control over and responsibility for Gaza, even if only de jure, and rendering the political talks with him pointless, since in any case they cannot be applicable to all of Palestine? Even more serious, in this case, in a situation in which Hamas is conducting a violent struggle against Israel, and Israel has no choice but to react militarily, even the relative quiet in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is liable to collapse.

The other possibility is to arrive at the same status of talks and the same result, but without undermining at least Abbas’ symbolic status. Instead of offering itself as a direct or indirect partner to talks with Hamas, Israel has to try to transfer this dialogue to the Palestinian playing field, and to encourage the establishment of a PA that will include Hamas, thereby building a valid leadership that can exercise control. What is interesting is that both Hamas and Fatah are interested in the establishment of such a dialogue between themselves, and in cooperation. The idea of such a reconciliation also enjoys Egyptian and Saudi support, even if it delays that same peace process that is not going anywhere meanwhile, mainly because the PA is incapable of implementing the iron rule of the road map: a war against terror, which is a euphemism for dismantling Hamas. Anyone looking for an example of the implications of such a split can look across Israel’s northern border, at Lebanon, where Hizbullah has succeeded in paralyzing a government and a country.

The reestablishment of a Palestinian unity government will create a single Palestinian address vis-a-vis which it will be possible at least to conduct the conflict, if there is no way at the moment of achieving a solution. Because even now Israel is talking about a “drawing-board agreement” rather than one that can be implemented. Such a Palestinian unity government, like the one formed last year, would not prevent the continuation of the political dialogue with Abbas, to which Hamas has already agreed in any case, and would not deny him legitimacy as a representative of the entire Palestinian people.

On the other hand, maintaining the split between Hamas and the PA will leave a permanent conflagration raging on the Palestinian front. Hamas will continue to use violent means, not only to respond to Israeli actions, but also to try to continue to force Fatah and Abbas to turn back the wheel — in other words, to restore to Hamas the political achievements it attained in the elections.