Almost two weeks after the Doha agreement put an end to 18 months of political conflict in Lebanon, the situation on the ground remains shaky. Sectarian and partisan-inspired incidents have become almost a daily occurrence in Beirut and other areas. In the past week alone, Lebanese opposition forces documented 37 instances in which its supporters have been subject to physical attack in the capital’s Tareq Jdeeda district alone, hotbed of Saad Al-Hariri’s Tayyar Al-Mustaqbal (Future Movement) supporters. Such incidents, however, remain isolated and mostly individually based.

The Hizbullah-led takeover of Al-Mustaqbal offices in Beirut last month undoubtedly led to unintended consequences. The targeting of opposition supporters is one. More serious, however, is providing radicals amongst Al-Mustaqbal’s Islamist supporters with ammunition to fan the flames of sectarian tension.

Weakened by what happened and lacking a sound political project to offer to his own constituency — some of whom are beginning to question his leadership of Lebanon’s Sunnis — Al-Hariri has undoubtedly paid a heavy price to his credibility. His most ideological allies — Salafist forces in Tripoli — speak of his recent performance in derisive tone. “We have been insulted by what Hizbullah did in Beirut, but much more by what Al-Hariri did not do,” said Hassan Al-Shahal, head of the Institute for Islamic Call and Guidance, which teaches Islamic thought. “He has done nothing to defend ahl al-Sunna [the Sunnis],” Al-Shahal said.

Interviews with some pro-Hariri Islamists in Tripoli echoed Al-Shahal’s words, suggesting a shift in the alliance that was established following the killing of former prime minister Rafik Al-Hariri and consolidated by the 2005 elections. Islamist votes and mobilization tactics helped secure all 28 seats of the north for Al-Hariri. Undoubtedly, the Mustaqbal-Salafist relationship is undergoing its most difficult period today. Although on the surface the alliance appears intact, cracks have been widening since the country’s Sunni leadership — political and religious — gave its assent for the Lebanese army’s military campaign against Fatah Al-Islam in Nahr Al-Bared Refugee Camp a year ago. Today, there are 450 detainees — including members of Fatah Al-Islam — from Tripoli alone in Lebanese prisons on charges of supporting terrorism and related charges.

Pro-Hariri Islamists for long kept criticism of Al-Hariri’s political conduct hushed. In a country so polarized along sectarian lines the unity of Sunnis took precedence over everything else. Sensing their increasing influence on the street, pro-Hariri Islamists are stating their demands. Although they present themselves as being above the political game in Lebanon, some are seeking positions of power and funds in return for past services.

What does this new situation mean in terms of the political choices available to Lebanon’s Sunnis and to what extent has Al-Mustaqbal been weakened by recent events? Some pro-Hariri Islamists are said to be working to fill the vacuum left by a weakened Al-Mustaqbal movement. Such a development also raises questions about the future of the alliance particularly when Lebanon is 10 months away from parliamentary elections, due May 2009. Expected electoral alliances and electoral lists dominate discussion, especially in the north.

Shortly after the guns fell silent, the Lebanese press was awash with stories featuring what they described as “a remarkable decline in the popularity of Al-Mustaqbal” among Lebanon’s Sunnis, particularly in the north. “The citadel has fallen down,” wrote commentator Ibrahim Al-Amin, referring to Al-Mustaqbal in Tripoli. Other press reports talked about “a movement in tatters.” Pro-opposition press stretched the argument further to suggest that Sunni Islamists and Salafist forces were competing to expand their sphere of influence and attract Al-Mustaqbal’s disillusioned and disappointed constituency.

Although Al-Mustaqbal did lose part of its political capital during the Hizbullah-led takeover of Al-Mustaqbal offices in Beirut, and despite a sense of frustration amongst an important segment of its popular base, the movement still holds its place as the dominant political force among Sunnis. Nonetheless, it is weakened, in part due to the lack of political vision of Al-Hariri. In attempting to consolidate his position as leader of the Sunnis, Al-Hariri and advisers resorted to giving handouts to the poor, setting up fighting forces in the form of security firms, recruited from poor areas in Tripoli and Akkar, and claiming a gloss of religious legitimacy co-opting the Sunni mufti and an army of sheikhs in the north. His most dangerous tool has been the media he owns, where sectarian fears are stoked as a means to distract attention away from his political failure.

Giving handouts to poor Sunnis does not secure popular support in the long term. Opponents, particularly in the ranks of Islamists in alliance with the opposition, say Al-Mustaqbal never had a genuine base and that it was only through constituting mini-militias, spreading handouts and playing on sectarian fears that its existence was sustained.

“People only had sympathy because of [Rafik] Al-Hariri’s killing,” explained Bilal Shaban, head of the Tripoli-based Harket Al-Tawheed, an Islamist movement in alliance with the Hizbullah-led opposition. “But this is over now because Al-Hariri will not be killed again.”

The most dangerous consequence of a bruised Al-Mustaqbal, says Shaban, is its attempt to restore lost credibility by intensifying its sectarian rhetoric through media outlets and Islamist allies. This has been done, but without conviction. A few days after events in Beirut, the Tripoli-based Sunni Resistance Front issued a statement calling for jihad to defend Sunnis . The next day, Al-Hariri reportedly called one of the signatories, Khaled Daher, to reprimand him. “You wanted to defend Beirut, instead you are almost creating Al-Qaeda,” Al-Hariri was reported to have said.

On another occasion, when Al-Hariri was asked by Al-Shahal to arm the Sunnis his immediate reaction was “No.”  Both incidents are cited by Al-Hariri supporters to dismiss allegations that Al-Hariri has sought to set up a Sunni militia to face up to Hizbullah. What such incidents may also suggest is that sectarian incitement may have reached a level where Al-Hariri himself fears losing control over it.

Several reports have suggested that Al-Hariri’s Islamist allies have been moving fast to fill a leadership vacuum in the Sunni street. While some Salafist figures make no secret of their disappointment with Al-Hariri, they nonetheless dismiss reports that some seek to take his position as baseless. Al-Mustaqbal was defeated in Beirut, they argue, because it failed to embrace Islamists and instead became a secular movement. While seeking now to extend their influence, they affirm that the unity of Sunnis is paramount above immediate political interests. But their support for Al-Hariri will no longer be unconditional.

“We knew we were being used by Al-Hariri as a bridge to reach parliament and we accepted this because the unity of the sect took precedence over all other interests. But he did not show any appreciation for what we did and continued to exclude Islamists from all positions of power be it the government or the parliament,” said Al-Shahal.

Al-Shahal ran for elections in 2005 but lost because the Salafist vote had been promised to Al-Hariri’s list. He plans to run for elections in 2009 and is expecting Al-Mustaqbal to admit him to its electoral list.

Although it is difficult to measure the influence of Salafist groups in terms of numbers, they maintain deep-seated support in the north. “It might be small in numbers,” says one Tripoli-based journalist, “but it is a significant support, especially since the majority of its followers are young men.” Their ability to mobilize has given them added political value, particularly in times of extreme polarization and tension, as has been the case during the past 18 months of political gridlock. Following events in Beirut, the popularity of the Salafist leaders rose. This was reflected in the increasing number of young men joining the ranks of fiery Salafist preachers like Dai Al-Islam Al-Shahal.

Will this rising popularity translate into effective power? For now, the ball appears to be in the court of Al-Hariri. “If Al-Mustaqbal repeats this mistake of excluding Islamists and Salafists from its electoral list, the Salafists will have to reconsider their support for Al-Hariri,” said Al-Shahal.

Reprinted from Al-Ahram Weekly Online