Relations between Iraq and Syria plunged abruptly on Tuesday after Baghdad recalled its ambassador to Damascus over the recent bombings in the Iraqi capital in which 100 Iraqis were killed.

Iraqi ambassador in Syria Ala al-Jawadi speaks during a news conference at his office in Damascus August 25, 2009. Iraq and Syria recalled their ambassadors on Tuesday after Baghdad demanded Damascus hand over two people it says masterminded bombings in the Iraqi capital last week that killed almost 100 people. Iraq’s Shi’a-led government has blamed supporters of Saddam Hussein’s outlawed Baath party for massive truck bombs and other attacks last Wednesday, and says it has already captured some suspects it deems responsible. REUTERS/Khaled al-Hariri

The attacks, which ripped through government buildings on August 19, were the worst in Iraq in over 12 months and came just a day after Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki wrapped up a state visit to Syria. While there he boosted political and economic relations with Syria and jump-started bilateral committees to see that security is strongly monitored on the Syrian-Iraqi border.
Since then, however, a tug-of-war has erupted within Iraq between those who blame al-Qaeda and the outlawed Ba’ath Party and those who blame Iran for the Black Wednesday attacks.

Maliki blames both, while Defense Minister Abdul Qadir Obeidi said the weapons used for the attacks had been “made in Iran.” Syria’s name emerged rather suddenly on Sunday, when a former policeman appeared on Iraqi state-run media, claiming responsibility for the attacks, saying they had been ordered by two Saddam loyalists based in Syria.

The Iraqi government thus recalled its ambassador on Tuesday, asking that Syria extradite two men — Mohammad Yunis Ahmad and Satman Farhan — who are the alleged masterminds of the Baghdad bombings.

The Syrians were infuriated by the accusations, responding immediately by recalling their own diplomat, Nawwaf al-Fares, from Baghdad. A statement from Syria categorically rejected the Iraqi claims, reminding that “Syria had forcefully denounced this terrorist act which left victims among the Iraqi people”.

The Syrians added they would welcome an Iraqi delegation that brought with it concrete evidence justifying the accusations, “or else, it considers what was aired by the Iraqi media as nothing but evidence fabricated for internal [Iraqi] objectives.”

The contradicting remarks by Iraqi officials, the Syrian statement added, were adequate proof that far from being authentic, the entire ordeal was a fabrication of the Iraqi government.

Syrian-Iraqi relations have improved significantly in recent months, following two visits by Maliki to Damascus and a visit this summer by Prime Minister Mohammad Naji Otari to Baghdad. The countries seemingly realized that they had much in common, despite Syria’s colossal differences with the Maliki regime, which was brought to power by the U.S. in 2006.

The Syrians reasoned they could play an influential role in restoring stability to Iraq, which was a high priority on Maliki’s agenda, given their excellent relations with Iraqi Sunnis and Shi’a heavyweights like Muqtada al-Sadr. Iraqi tribes, which once formed the Sunni insurgency and which are now the backbone of the Awakening Councils, overlap extensively with their cousins in the Syrian desert.

Syria can build on its excellent relations with these tribes to tame, and eventually disarm, armed groups in Iraq. It can help with more border security, given that it shares a common enemy with Maliki — al-Qaeda-linked fundamentalists.

Chaos in Iraq is dangerous for the Syrians from a national security perspective because it could easily spill over into Syria, as was the case with several attempted terrorist attacks in 2004-2007. During investigations, it was revealed that many of the terrorists that had tried launching attacks within Syria had either been to Iraq, or obtained arms from Iraq.

So, helping Maliki to bring security to Baghdad was also a high priority for Damascus, and it played well into Syria’s newfound relationship with the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama. The Syrians reason that Obama wants peace in Iraq to facilitate a smooth exodus for U.S. troops by early 2012.

For their part, the Syrians want Obama to jump-start peace talks by applying strong pressure on the hardline Israeli government to restore the occupied Golan Heights to Syria. If the Syrians deliver on Iraq, Obama would deliver on the Middle East peace process. This win-win formula seemed to be working well since January, when the Syrians used their considerable influence with different segments of Iraq to secure safe and democratic provincial elections. As a result, Obama indeed did take tangible steps towards regional peace, summed up in his speech at Cairo University on June 4.

If this relationship was going so well, why in the world would Syria approve — or turn a blind eye to — such a massive operation in Baghdad? There is not a single argument in favor of the Iraqi argument, because from where the Syrians see it, such an operation would be like shooting oneself in the foot.

All it does is poison the neighborhood, negatively affecting both Syrian-Iraqi and Syrian-U.S. relations. It additionally sends all the wrong messages since the bombings did not target a particular leader or sect, but a political system at large; one with which the Syrians have been comfortably cooperating since 2006.

Nothing in the world would have better served Syria’s interest than uncovering the operation before it happened, then handing its culprits over to the Iraqi government, or the Americans. The fact that it did not simply means that it had no clue that such an operation was being hatched. If it did, it would surely have acted accordingly.

Iraqi officials can immediately disqualify this argument, however, saying that the two Ba’athists based in Syria could have acted without the knowledge of the Syrian government. This is also difficult to digest, since all the Iraqi refugees in Syria are closely watched to make sure they refrain from any illegal activity. Additionally, the timing of the operation could not have been worse — 24 hours after Maliki summed up a successful visit to Syria, and while relations were steadily improving with the U.S.

If this is the case, then why blame Syria? Clearly, from the contradicting remarks of Iraqi ministers, Black Wednesday puts many top officials in very difficult positions. It proves just how weak and divided they are — exposing them before ordinary Iraqis who are furious at the rising death toll and want answers from their elected representatives.

More horrendous attacks took place from 2005 to 2008, and never aroused such a stir. The fact that this comes after 18 months of relative peace strikes a raw nerve in the Iraqi street. Self-criticism is uncommon in the Arab world and neither the minister of interior nor the minister of defense was prepared to take the blame for Black Wednesday.

What is always easier than shouldering responsibility is blaming others for one’s own shortcomings. Iraqi officials mistakenly thought that they had a ready scapegoat in Syria. After all, not too long ago, Syria was a scapegoat for everything rotten taking place in Iraq.

Whenever Iraqi officials wanted to justify their shortcomings, they blamed the violence on Damascus, and always found a supportive George W Bush administration willing to back their claims.

Nobody in Iraq wants to know who carried out the Wednesday attacks, because reality would expose dramatic mismanagement of government office. That in turn would drown many parliamentary hopefuls in January’s elections. It therefore suits all officials to cover up for their shortcomings by blaming Syria.

Nobody in the Iraqi government would dare blame Iran or Saudi Arabia, because of the financial and military clout these countries have in Iraq, along with their respective armies of followers. Left standing is Syria, which happens to be Ba’athist and still has Iraqi fugitives on its territory.

In recalling their ambassador from Damascus, the Iraqis will have to deal with the aftershocks in their relationship with Syria. Iraq needs the Syrians much more than Damascus needs Baghdad. Iraq needs it for economic issues related to the pumping of oil and rebuilding of the war-torn country. It needs it to mediate explosive conflicts between Sunnis, Shi’a and Kurds, whose leaders were all one-time residents of Damascus and still have excellent relations with the Syrians.

Iraq needs it to police the Syrian-Iraqi border, and to continue playing host to over 1 million Iraqi refugees based in Syria since 2003. Iraq needs Damascus to mediate talks between Maliki and both Ba’athists and Sunni tribes. It also needs the Syrians to legitimize the Maliki regime, or whatever succeeds it in January, in the eyes of ordinary Iraqi Sunnis who have historically looked towards Syria for shelter and support.

When Syria decided to open an embassy in Baghdad in late 2008, this greatly legitimized Maliki in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis, who until then saw him as nothing but a sectarian clown who had nothing but animosity for the Sunni community and wanted to punish it collectively for having produced Saddam Hussein.

It is one thing when countries like Jordan or Egypt recognize Maliki and legitimize his administration, but a completely different matter when this is done by Syria, a country that remains dominated by a strong brand of Arab nationalism that is appealing to the Iraqi street.

In as much as the sending of an ambassador was symbolic for the Syrians, recalling him is equally symbolic, and will cause plenty of damage for the prime minister, who needs a broad constituency among Sunnis and Shi’a in preparation for the elections.

Sami Moubayed is editor-in-chief of Forward Magazine in Syria.