In one week, the Trump administration passed a United Nations Security Council resolution on Gaza and released a 28-point peace plan for Ukraine. Commentators and critics have noted both similarities and profound differences between the two initiatives.

First, both plans appear to be driven by the simple and commendable goal of ending ongoing violence. The plans’ problems, however, stem from initial drafting without the input of either the Palestinians or Ukrainians.

The Gaza plan’s exact origins remain somewhat murky, but the absence of Palestinian participation is clear.

The Ukrainian plan’s origins have been a subject of some controversy. At first the U.S. claimed it had been developed with the Russians, based on a Russian draft, before denying any U.S. involvement. They later “clarified” that it had been a joint U.S.-Russian effort. After pushback from Europeans and some Republican senators, the U.S. engaged with the Ukrainians, making some changes which may or may not be acceptable to the Russians.

Herein lies a difference between the two plans. Ukraine is recognized as a sovereign entity, despite the draft plan’s allowing for violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty. The plan for Gaza not only doesn’t acknowledge Palestinian sovereignty but also goes to great lengths to erase it. It subjects Palestinians to the whims of Israel and international bodies — led by the U.S. — which will be positioned to make decisions that will shape the Palestinian people’s future.

The plan for Gaza not only doesn’t acknowledge Palestinian sovereignty but goes to great lengths to erase it.

Feints toward Palestinian sovereignty remain — a “tip of the hat” to the Saudi-French Proposal, references to a Palestinian police force and the idea that a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) “may” be involved in the future. But these are conditioned on terms established by others, rather than as rights. It pours cold water on the giddiness accompanying the Special Session on Palestine that preceded the opening of this year’s General Assembly when a number of states recognized Palestinian statehood.

Especially concerning in this slighting of the PA is the lack of acknowledgement by the Gaza plan’s architects that Israel has, for three decades, done its best to ensure the PA’s failure.

Today, the PA, while still conceptually representing the promise of Palestinian statehood, is increasingly seen in the West Bank as a subordinate acting on behalf of Israel rather than an independent self-governing entity representing Palestinian aspirations.

The Gaza plan’s insistence that the PA reform begs a number of questions. What exactly are these reforms? Can the PA implement reforms under continuing Israeli domination of the West Bank? With Israel as one of the parties designated to establish and measure the metrics of reform, will a compliant PA have the credibility it needs to govern or be seen as the agent of the true sovereign, Israel?

Finally, while the Ukraine plan’s initial version does include some constraints on Russia — even before recent reports of still unseen Ukrainian modifications — there are no such constraints imposed on Israel in the U.N. Gaza plan. Even the agreed-upon “ceasefire” remains elusive, with Israel acting with impunity as the ceasefire’s sole enforcer, bombing Palestinians daily. Furthermore, Israel still controls access and egress to the portion of Gaza from which they’ve withdrawn, and Palestinians remain largely without adequate shelter, food and medical services as winter approaches.

The Gaza plan imposes constraints on Palestinians but none on Israel — leaving implementation entirely in Israel’s hands.

One decisive difference in the two plans’ development has been the roles played by external forces. Ukraine has the backing of a near-unified European bloc, coupled with support from Republicans driven by anti-Russian animus. This tempered even the initial U.S. 28-point plan. While the Gaza plan had its origins in an Arab draft, and Arab states and others were able to insert some language in the U.N. Gaza resolution, by the time the U.S. and Israel stripped it down and President Trump put his imprimatur on it, Palestinian rights were gone.

It’s not too late for Arabs to demand better terms, for Palestinians to put their house in order creating a unified national plan of governance for the West Bank and Gaza. and for Arabs and Palestinians to insist that those nations who’ve recognized Palestinian statehood call for reopening the debate on Palestine’s future. If changes aren’t made, in short order, we will tragically be right back where we started.