Millions of Iraqis braved bombs and bullets to vote on March 7, 2010, in Iraq’s second free elections in a half-century. The vote counting process proved to be more chaotic than expected, with accusations of fraud by leading parties, divisions among highly politicized electoral officials and chaos in disclosing the results. In the subsequent weeks, talks have been bogged down over the formation of the new government.The coalition led by Ayad Allawi, a secular Shi’i and former prime minister who has emerged as a default leader for Sunnis, scored gains in Iraq’s Sunni provinces overwhelmingly.U.S. military officials and diplomats read Mr. Allawi’s strong showing as a victory for a cross-sectarian alliance and have been urging Iraqis to embrace and engage former Ba’thists and Arab Sunni rejectionists. If the Sunnis can be brought into the fold, the conventional wisdom goes, peace and reconciliation will prevail.This assertion is based on faulty reasoning with no evidence to prove it works. Many of the insurgents are rejectionists with no desire to be a part of a new political process. They have neither voiced a political vision nor contributed to the well-being or safety of ordinary Iraqis. Their chief victims are not U.S. soldiers, but rather other Iraqis. These rejectionists have adopted a wider Arab nationalism as their main ideology, whereas the Shi’a have preferred Iraqi nationalism, which stresses the distinct values and heritage of Iraqi society.While terrorists alone bear responsibility for their actions, flawed U.S. policy has undermined stability and undercut Iraqi attempts to rectify security. Many Iraqi politicians, be they Arab Shi’a,  Arab Sunni, or Kurdish, correlate the upsurge in insurgent attacks to the April 2004 decision by Coalition Provisional Authority administrator L. Paul Bremer to reverse de -Ba’athification. In effect, Bremer traded the good will of Iraq’s 14 million Shi’a and six million Kurds for the sake of perhaps 40,000 Ba’thists.The United States’ reversal of de -Ba’athification will go down in the history of the Iraq conflict as one of the gravest strategic errors made in a big field full of grave errors. The U.S. military in Iraq has never fully understood the complex interplay between the Sunni resistance, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and the former government of Saddam Hussein. Saddam may be dead, but not so his plans for resistance. The massive security organizations which held sway over Iraq during his rule were never defeated, and never formally disbanded. The organs of security which once operated as formal ministries now operate as covert cells, functioning along internal lines of communication which are virtually impenetrable by outside forces. These security organs gave birth to al-Qaeda in Iraq, fostered its growth as a proxy, and used it as a means of sowing chaos and fear among the Iraqi population.Al-Qaeda in Iraq is not a physical entity which the United States can get its hands around, but rather a giant con game being run by the Ba’athists and the Sunni rejectionists. And the greatest con game of them all occurred when the Sunni resistance manipulated the United States into arming it, training it and turning it against the forces of al-Qaeda, which it controls. It is as if we were arming and training the Viet Cong on the eve of the Tet offensive during the Vietnam War.The big loser in all of this, besides the people of Iraq, is of course the men and women of the armed forces of the United States. Betrayed by the past and current administrations, abandoned by Congress and all but forgotten by a complacent American population, the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who so proudly wear the uniform of the United States continue to fight and die, kill and be maimed in a war which was never justified and long ago lost its luster. Played as pawns in a giant game of three-dimensional chess, these brave Americans find themselves being needlessly sacrificed in a game where there can be no winner, only losers.The continued ambivalence of the American population as a whole toward the war in Iraq, perhaps best manifested by the superficiality of the slogan “Support the Troops,” all the while remaining ignorant of what the troops are actually doing, has led to a similar amnesia among politicians all too willing to allow themselves to seek political advantage at the expense of American life and treasure.If we want Iraq to continue on the path to stability, security, and democracy, we should listen to the Iraqis. U.S. officials should not interfere with Iraqi politicians who aim for sweeping de-Ba’athification. Iraqis understand the nuances of their history, security, and politics better than any diplomat serving a six-month tour, or serviceman without personal connection to their country. Several Iraqi politicians have suggested that they may consider a policy under which former party members might still work in government, but be prohibited from assuming any position of command authority; i.e., colonel or above in the Iraqi military, or director-general or above in civil service.American diplomats and intelligence officers may not want to see their contacts lose their  jobs or suffer demotion, but such may be the price not only of security, but also of sovereignty and democracy. Reversing the insurgency — and enabling Iraq’s fragile democracy to take root — will require listening to Iraqis. While the Multinational Forces, the European Union, and the Jordanian government may run training programs for the Iraqi recruits, Iraqi officials — not foreigners — should decide who should take part. Iraqis are capable of building a better life, if they not be hampered by American naïveté, however well-meaning it may be.The writer is professor of Interdisciplinary Studies at the University of Toledo in Toledo, Ohio.